Panchayati Raj Institutions -Thirty Years after the 73rd Amendment of the Indian Constitution

Introduction

From the time of the freedom struggle to the present day, there has been recognition in India that Panchayat Raj is imperative for both deepening India’s democracy and making its development process more inclusive.The aim is to involve the people in the running of their own affairs in their respective neighbourhood communities. It is recognized that Panchayats comprising their own elected representatives, responsible to their own community, would be more likely to respond to the needs and demands of the neighbourhood communities than a distant bureaucracy.

While these ideas were well understood since independence, owing to a focus on various other priorities, they had been ignored by the political elite for a long time. It was only after the advocacy by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi that led to the passing of the historic 73rd Amendment, these institutions of local governance received constitutional status in 1992. However, the actual progress in securing the goal of democratic local governance has been uncertain and not sustained.There are now nearly 300,000 units of local self-government, to which some 3.2 million representatives have been elected, 1.2 million of whom are women.

However, instead of empowering this democratically elected community and neighbourhood leaders to deliver public goods and services to the intended beneficiaries, State governments continue relying on the bureaucracy to do so. In consequence, outcomes are nowhere near commensurate with goals.This paper aims to review the 73rd Amendment and the status of Panchayats in six states in order to understand some of the key issues that are hindering the fulfillment of the objectives of democratic local governance and inclusive growth.

History of Panchayats in Pre-Independence India

In India the concept of panchayats as partly autonomous village governments can be traced, with some certainty,into medieval times.A number of inscriptions mention village communities, which act in common accord and exert some judicial and administrative powers; they also mention common action of village communities¹. However, claims of antiquity of democratic self-governance in villages should be considered carefully² .The concept of Panchayati Raj as a democratic institutional arrangement is modern.

As a formal administrative unit panchayats were first used by the British colonial authority from the second half of the 19th century³. The British started to take the issue of local administration seriously when they established the first local institutions in territorial units called ‘unions’, that were used to maintain law and order in villages and at the same time levy taxes to finance village policing under the Bengal Chowkidari Act 1870⁴. In the same year attempts to devolve administrative powers and public duties in municipal areas were also made by Lord Mayo’s resolution, 1870⁵. For rural British India the decisive act was the Ripon Resolution of 1882 that established ‘taluks’ or sub-divisional boards of administration. The resolution called for local self-government through elections of officials and the ability to levy their own revenue to cover their expenditures⁶. However, the resolution was primarily implemented in the Central Provinces. Over the next few decades further attempts were made to enlarge and strengthen local administration.

At the turn of the century the Royal Commission on Decentralisation reviewed some of the existing efforts from 1907 to 1909 and recommended major improvements and the re-establishment of local administrative units in all provinces⁷. The commission also recommended panchayats be constituted and entrusted with judiciary functions in petty civil and criminal cases, the levy of revenue to execute minor public works in villages, and the construction and maintenance of village schools, amongst others.⁸. The main purpose behind the commission’s suggestions was to delegate minor public duties to local authorities in order to relieve the workload of officials at higher administrative levels⁹. They also included provisions for an “elections by the villagers”; even though, no mode of election was proposed¹⁰. Additionally, the panchayats were also subject to the supervision of the District Officer and could be dissolved at his will¹¹. It was, however, an important step towards a more self-reliant, indigenous administration at the village level. Although the Government of India accepted the recommendations and allowed their implementation through a resolution in 1915 (Governor-General of India), only a few panchayats were actually constituted and the process was generally slow and tedious ¹².

Evaluating the implementation of the 1915 resolution, the Montagu- Chelmsford report found many problems and subsequently suggested in 1918 that a new initiative towards improved local self-government be taken.The report recommended expanding the franchise in panchayat elections to include a broader representation of the village population, restricted to male taxpayers, an elected president and nominated members from minorities¹³. These measures were intended to increase local interest in their administrative affairs and to ‘educate’ the population politically and administratively¹⁴.Thereafter, the Government of India Act of 1919 enabled provincial legislatures to enact laws that entrusted panchayats with the recommended powers.The Bengal, Madras and the United Provinces were at the fore front, and The Bengal Village Self-Government Act, 1919¹⁵ and the Madras Village Panchayat Act, 1920¹⁶ were enacted at the time. Over the next decade the electoral base of the panchayats were also expanded.

In 1935, the Government of India Act, 1935 ended the parallel structure of administration laid down by the 1919 Act which had made the elected ministers responsible to the provincial legislative assemblies and the implementers responsible to the governor. Most of the powers and duties were transferred to the provincial legislatures; this included all powers over self- governance in villages¹⁷. However, the provincial acts were not uniform across India. The definition of panchayat areas differed from province to province and even within provinces there were differences in terms of which areas were under panchayats and which were not. While several provincial acts were passed to formalise and extend the duties of panchayats until 1940, these efforts stopped with the onset of World War II. The Congress leaders, initially sympathetic towards Britain’s cause in the war against fascism, were angered that their elected representatives were not consulted before the declaration of war against Germany¹⁸. Consequently, they started a campaign of non-cooperation and left the provincial governments, where they were in charge of village administrations¹⁹. Subsequently, no efforts were made towards decentralization between 1940 and 1946 ²⁰.

In addition to the provinces under British India, many of the princely states, under the British influence had also started implementing legislations to enable village self-government, and until 1946, 18 of these semi-independent States had enacted such laws²¹. While these were important steps towards self governance in villages it is important to note that the British did not develop this system of decentralisation to democratise the Indian population; this was by no means the intention. It was primarily a way to delegate duties to native administrators at the local level and therefore, to reduce the administrative cost in often-remote areas²². The Bengal Chowkidari Act 1870 is a prime example as it essentially delegated the responsibility as well as the cost of policing villages to the local inhabitants, making local law enforcement cost-neutral to the British authorities²³. Both, cost-efficiency and appeasement to the growing independence movement motivated the British to further delegate duties to Indian representatives. The idea that locals could be appeased if they could participate in administrative decisions at the village level was a factor in devolving duties of public works and minor judiciary functions²⁴.

Parallel to these formal institutional arrangements that evolved between 1870 and 1947 in British India, there always existed informal arrangements that represented caste or religious groups in villages. In some cases, these panchayats represented the whole village community. These informal panchayats exercised considerable influence over their respective members, fulfilled judicial duties, mediated between groups and governed customs and traditions²⁵. Usually, the traditional panchayats were either meetings of village elders or representatives of the village castes, and were mostly dominated by the Brahmins²⁶. Women were normally excluded from these meetings, as were Dalits²⁷. Some informal panchayats were also formed as part of the independence movement during the first half of the 20th century, following Gandhi’s ideal of the village swaraj²⁸, usually transcending the caste-barriers; but even in those cases, the caste-panchayats continued to exist in parallel²⁹.The legacy of the panchayat in pre independence India was therefore twofold: The British way of formalising village panchayats to enforce law and order and to execute public duties; and the tradition of group representation within village communities through caste panchayats that enforced traditional law and customs and mediated between groups.

Panchayats in the Constituent Assembly Debates

While the debates on rural decentralization during the Colonial period were concerned with effective governance, the debates in the Constituent Assembly on Panchayati Raj were more fundamentally grounded.There were two viewpoints in contestation, that of Gandhi presented by his followers, and that of Ambedkar.Village swaraj was the centrepiece of Gandhi’s vision of an independent India. This followed from his fundamental opposition to parliamentary democracy which he saw as perpetuating domination and from his belief in an economy of limited wants and based upon local production, resources, consumption and technologies. He outlined this vision of the village republic in the issue of Harijan in July 26, 1942.

My idea of village swaraj is that it is a complete republic, independent of its neighbours for its vital wants, and yet interdependent for many others in which dependence is a necessity. Thus the village’s first concern will be to grow its own food crops and cotton for its cloth. It should have a reserve for its cattle, recreation and playground for adults and children… The village will maintain a village theatre, school and public hall. It will have its own waterworks ensuring a clean water supply. This can be done through controlled wells or tanks. Education will be compulsory up to the final basic course.As far as possible every activity will be conducted on a co-operative basis.There will be no caste, such as we have today with their graded untouchability. Non-violence with its technique of Satyagraha and non-cooperation will be the sanction of the village community. … The Panchayat of five persons annually elected by the adult villagers, male and female, possessing minimum prescribed qualifications will conduct the government of the village.These will have all the authority and jurisdiction required. Since there will be no system of punishments in the accepted sense, this Panchayat will be the legislature, judiciary, and executive combined to operate for its year in office. Any village can become such a republic without much interference.³⁰

Such village republics would be interlinked in a set of ‘ever widening, never ascending circles. Life will not be a pyramid with the apex sustained by the bottom. But it will be an oceanic circle whose centre will be the individual always ready to perish for the village, the latter ready to perish for the circle of villages, till at last the whole becomes one life composed of individuals, never aggressive in their arrogance but ever humble, sharing the majesty of their oceanic circle of which they are integral units…’ ³¹

In this statement one can see Gandhi’s belief in the primary harmony of social existence, the essentially co-operative nature of social exchange, and the importance of face to face relationships. Central to his vision was the privileging of the local over the distant. Participation in politics therefore became an integral part of public life.The stature of Gandhi and the appeal of his vision caused some of the members of the Constituent Assembly to argue for it to be the political model for Independent India.³² Some Gandhians involved in the draft process advocated the inclusion of Panchayati Raj into the constitution as either a fundamental right or a federal institution. K.T. Shah and L.N. Mishra had even drafted motions to include Panchayats as integral parts of the Indian Union. ³³

Dr. B.R. Ambedkar opposed these suggestions since he saw villages in India differently and since he believed that the path of the future lay in a constitutional parliamentary democracy. In strong language he denounced the proposal to make the village the basic unit of the political system. Ambedkar had stated:

It is said that the new Constitution should have been drafted on the ancient Hindu model of a state and that instead of incorporating Western theories the new Constitution should have been raised and built upon village Panchayats and District Panchayats… They just want India to contain so many village governments. The love of the intellectual Indian for the village community is of course infinite if not pathetic… I hold that the village republics have been the ruination of India. I am therefore surprised that those who condemn provincialism and communalism should come forward as champions of the village.What is the village but a sink of localism, a den of ignorance, narrow-mindedness and communalism? I am glad that the Draft Constitution has discarded the village and adopted the individual as its unit.³⁴

Ambedkar’s remarks were rooted in an experience of oppressive caste and feudal structures in rural India.The village for Ambedkar represented regressive India, a source of oppression. The modern state hence had to build safeguards against such social oppression and the only way it could be done was through the adoption of a parliamentary model of politics. Ambedkar’s remarks caused a furore amongst Gandhians, who expressed their disagreement and lamented that the village, which was an essential feature of Indian social and political life, found no recognition in the Constitution³⁵.A compromise was forged and PRIs found place in the non-justiciable part of the Constitution, the Directive Principles of State policy, as Article 40.It stated ‘The State shall take steps to organise village Panchayats and endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self- government’³⁶.The late\ inclusion and shift to the directive principles nevertheless continued to cause criticism during the Constituent Assembly debates³⁷.

 Evolution of Panchayats from 1947 to 1992

When India became independent on 15 August 1947 most institutions from the colonial period remained in place until 1950. Additionally, India was not yet consolidated in terms of territory or in terms of Constitution. Furthermore, the violent partition and the Kashmir issue called for the immediate attention of the political elite. In such a situation, decentralized rural governance was not an immediate pressing issue³⁸. Nevertheless, the institutional legacy of the British gave impetus in creating some new acts on Panchayats. Adding to the already existing legislations, five new acts came into force between 1947 and 1950³⁹. Some new acts became necessary due to the merger of Union-States with former princely-States in order to unify legislation within States⁴⁰. Since no Constitution was in place at the time, the States were free to enact their own local government acts constituting panchayats, following the provisions of the Government of India Act of 1935, which remained in force until 1950.⁴¹

Most of the acts passed during the post-independence, pre-constitution period were updates of existing legislation to accommodate the new situation, and to simplify existing texts. Since the central government gave no recommendations on Panchayats, the States were relatively free to design their structure. The Saurashtra Gram Panchayat Ordinance of 1949 and the United Provinces Panchayat Act of 1949, for example, provided just a single tier structure of the Gram Panchayat, the Assam Panchayati Raj Act of 1948 provided for two tiers and the Madhya Bharat Panchayat Act of 1949140 provided a three-tier structure.

During the early 1950s, post the adoption of the Constitution, Gandhi’s village swaraj was kept on the back burner in the overall development plan, which was deeply committed to industrialisation, economic growth, and income redistribution⁴². The thrust on local governance started only with the community development program which occupied the central place in rural administration in the 50s. For the first time, the central government recognised the importance of the rural communities and the villages as units of development. For the development of villages various agencies, departments and ministries concerned with rural industries, agriculture and food, health and education integrated their programs⁴³. The Community Development Programme, however, established a system that was largely independent of any Panchayat System⁴⁴. Consequently, in the late 1950s the community development projects failed to evoke people’s participation⁴⁵.

The earliest committee to study decentralization issues was the Balwantrai Mehta Committee which was appointed in 1957 to study the Community Development Projects and the National Extension Service and to assess the extent to which the movement had succeeded in utilizing local initiatives and in creating institutions to ensure continuity in the process of improving economic and social conditions in rural areas⁴⁶. The Committee in its report expressed dissatisfaction over the centralised functioning of the programme and recommended that public participation in community work should be organised through statutory representative bodies. It suggested the following:⁴⁷

1. an early establishment of elected local bodies and devolution to them of necessary resources, power and authority,
2. That the basic unit of democratic decentralization was to be at the block/samiti level since the area of jurisdiction of the local body should neither be too large nor too The block was large enough for efficiency and economy of administration, and small enough for sustaining a sense of involvement in the citizens,
3. such a body must not be constrained by too much control by government or government agencies,
4. the body must be constituted for 5 years by indirect elections from the village Panchayats,
5. its functions should cover the development of agriculture in all its aspects, the promotion of local industries and other services such as drinking water, road building , and
6. The higher level body the Zilla Parishad would play an advisory role

Based on the recommendations of the Balwantrai Mehta Committee, by the early 1960s, PRIs began to be established in all parts of India. By March 1962, 204,000 village panchayats had been established and these served about 95 per cent of the rural population.⁴⁸

By the year 1963, Panchayati Raj legislation had been enacted in 12 States and Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads had been established in 10 States ⁴⁹. Zila Parishads were considered to be of utmost importance for rural development.

The Third Five Year Plan (1961-66) laid considerable stress to the rural sector to make India self sufficient in food production. Particular attention had been given to the administrative and functional aspects of Panchayati Raj.To carry out the responsibilities entrusted to them, PRIs at each level were in a position to secure adequate resources both from the State Government and the local level ⁵⁰. An important contribution of the panchayat movement had been to make available teams of trained workers to serve at block and village level.Thus, till the end of the third plan in 1966, the panchayats began to flourish.

The period between 1967 and 1977 was marked by two major developments: stagnation in the implementation of the Panchayati Raj system and an increasing centralisation. In the 1967 General Elections the Congress lost many seats. As a result, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, faced by challenges both within the party and within the government, attempted to consolidate her position by a process of centralisation of political and administrative power. ⁵¹ In the process, the panchayat system was ignored.⁵²

While many States had previously passed legislation to establish a three-tier Panchayat system following the B.R. Mehta Committee’s recommendations, the implementation of these acts stagnated; elections for Panchayats for example were not held ⁵³. Further, most initiatives for development came from the central leadership.Additionally, external factors, like the drought years of 1965 to 1967 and the wars with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971, took the focus of the central government away from decentralisation.As a result panchayats almost disappeared in various policy documents.⁵⁴

After the 1975-77 Emergency, the Indian National Congress led by Mrs. Indira Gandhi lost the General Election in March 1977. Considering the fact that panchayats had not fulfilled expectations, the Janata Party Government constituted a committee headed by Asoka Mehta to review the working of panchayats and to suggest measures to strengthen them.⁵⁵

The Committee considered the PRI experience post 1959 as having gone through three phases; (i) ascendancy (1959-64), (ii) stagnation (1965-69), (iii) and decline (1969-77)⁵⁶. Further, it felt that a combination of factors had conspired to undermine PRIs, such as an unsympathetic bureaucracy, absence of political will, lack of involvement in planning and implementation, confusion with respect to the role of PRIs, as well as the domination of the PRIs by the rural economic and social elite.⁵⁷ The Committee was the first to recognise the need for constitutional provisions for panchayats.At the time the states of Karnataka,Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal, passed new legislation based on the Asoka Committee Report. However, political dynamics did not allow these institutions to develop. In 1980 the unstable Janta Party dissolved bringing Indira Gandhi back to power and causing an intermission in the evolution of the panchayat.

It was not until Rajiv Gandhi became prime minister in 1984 was there a revival of interest in the Panchayat Raj. His personal interest in decentralisation and major changes in the Indian society, such as the beginning of liberalisation and the emergence of social movements, further triggered the revival. Rajiv Gandhi started his quest for a “responsive administration” through “representative” and, therefore,“responsible” institutions of local self government.⁵⁸

A committee headed by G.V.K. Rao was appointed by the Planning Commission in March 1985 to review the existing administrative arrangements for rural development and poverty alleviation programmes and to recommend structural mechanisms for the planning and implementation of these programmes in an integrated manner. The Committee submitted its report in December 1985 and recommended to activate “Panchayati Raj bodies, viz. the Zila Parishad, Panchayat Samitis, and Gram Panchayats”⁵⁹.The Committee further emphasised strengthening the role of the block development officer in the rural development process.

Another major attempt to regenerate PRIs was made with the appointment of the L. M. Singhvi Committee in 1986.The committee recommended that PRIs should be enshrined in the Constitution, and ‘Gram Sabha’ be the base of decentralised democracy ⁶⁰.The Committee also showed its displeasure over the irregularity of panchayat elections and dealt with the issue of the role of political parties in panchayat elections. Further, the Committee suggested that non-involvement of political parties should be consensual rather than through legislation ⁶¹.

On this issue the supporters of panchayats had two opinions. The Gandhians supported party less democracy while others argued for the involvement of political parties to support candidates with weak economic backgrounds ⁶². Notwithstanding, democratic momentum did not find pace to cater to the requirements of rural development ⁶³.

The 73rd Amendment

In 1989, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi proposed to assign constitutional status to PRIs and tabled the historic 64th Constitutional Amendment Bill⁶⁴ in the lower house of the parliament. Although he failed by five votes to muster in the Rajya Sabha the required two-thirds majority to amend the Constitution, his draft remained on the anvil.⁶⁵ This bill was opposed mainly because it was viewed as an instrument for the union government to deal directly with PRIs and bypass the state governments⁶⁶. Over time, however, consensus in favour of PRIs grew among all political parties.The National Front government that came into power for a short period introduced a bill for PRIs on September 7, 1990.

Finally, the Congress government, led by Narasimha Rao, which came back to power after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, introduced a constitutional amendment bill for PRIs in September 1991. After debate and discussion it was passed virtually unanimously in the Parliament on 22 December 1992, and became the Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act 1992 on April 24, 1993 after ratification by most State Assemblies⁶⁷.

Key Features of 73rd Constitutional Amendment⁶⁸

1. Part IX has been inserted immediately after ‘Part VIII’ of the Constitution and after the ‘Tenth Schedule’ of the Constitution, ‘ Eleventh Schedule ‘ has been added (Article 243G) which gives the detail list of functions to be performed by PRIs. Panchayats shall be constituted in every state at the village, intermediate and district levels, thus bringing about uniformity in the PR structure. However, the states having a population not exceeding 20 lakh have been given the option of not having any Panchayat at the intermediate level.
2. ZWhile the elections in respect of all the members to Panchayats at the level will be direct, the election in respect of the post of the Chairman at the intermediate and district level will be The mode of election of Chairman to the village level has been left to the State Government to decide. All members including the chairperson shall have the right to vote.
3. Reservation of seats for SC/STs has been provided in proportion to their population at each Not less than one-third of the total membership has been reserved for women (in both reserved and general category) and these seats may be allotted by rotation to different constituencies in a Panchayat. Similar reservations have been made in respect of the office of the chairperson also.
4. A uniform term of five years has been provided for the PRIs and in the event of dissolution or super session, election to constitute the body should be completed before the expiry of six months from the date of If the remainder period is less than six months, fresh elections may not be necessary. Panchayat constituted upon dissolution may continue for the remainder of the period.
5.  With a view to ensuring continuity, it has been provided in the Act that all the Panchayats existing immediately before the commencement of this Amendment Act will continue till the expiry of their duration unless dissolved by a resolution to that effect passed by the State Legislatures concerned or any law relating to the panchayats which before the amendment came into force, not inconsistent with its provisions shall continue, unless amended or repealed.
6. There shall be an Election Commission for the conduct of all elections to the panchayats consisting of a State Election Commissioner to be appointed by the State It shall also be in charge of superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls.
7. The State Legislatures have been given the power to authorise the Panchayats to levy, collect and appropriate suitable local taxes and also provide for making grants-in-aid to the Panchayats from the consolidated fund of the concerned state.
8. A State Finance Commission has to be constituted once in every five years to review the financial position of the Panchayat and to make suitable recommendations to the Governor as to the principles which should govern the distribution between the state and the panchayats of revenue, whether net proceeds of the taxes, duties, tolls, and fees leviable by the state or grants in aid and recommend measures to strengthen the financial position of the panchayat bodies and deliberate on any other matter referred to it by the Governor. The Constitution 73 rd amendment act adds a sub clause (bb) to Article 280 of the According to this sub clause, the Central Finance Commission, in addition to other stipulated duties, shall also make recommendations to the President regarding the measures needed to augment the then Consolidated Fund of a State to supplement the resources of the Panchayats in the State on the basis of the recommendations made by the Finance Commission of the State.

Nearly three decades have passed since the Constitution was amended. Panchayat Raj Institutions have now been established countrywide. Their establishment has coincided in time with the era of economic reforms, but the self-delivery of public goods and services through PRIs, which was the very purpose of the constitutional amendments, remains most uneven and continues to be a distant prospect.

Status of Panchayats

As local government is a State subject, State legislatures have a critical role in determining various aspects of Panchayati Raj in their States. States are keys as far as devolution of powers to Panchayats is concerned.The Constitution envisages that Panchayats will function as institutions of local government and prepare plans and implement schemes for economic development and social justice, but leaves the precise devolution of powers and authority to Panchayats to the States. Powers to impose taxes by and provisions of funds to the Panchayats are also determined by the States. Moreover, States play a critical role in building Panchayat capacities and in creating an appropriate framework for accountability and transparency. In this section, the implementation status of Panchayats has been assessed in six states in which the Panchayati Raj Extension to Scheduled Areas (PESA) Act⁶⁹ does not apply: Assam, Karnataka, Kerala, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. The status has been assessed based on the following four parameters: Representation, Elections, Devolution of Functions and Financial Resources.

i.  Representation

a) Representation of Women: Panchayat elections with gender quotas were instituted with the passage of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, mandating 3 per cent reservation for women in PRIs across India⁷⁰.Today, as many as 20 states, including Assam, Karnataka, Kerala, Punjab and West Bengal, have increased reservations for women in their PRIs to 50 per cent.⁷¹

Table 2: Percentage of Elected Women Representatives (As of 2018) 

Source: Ministry Of Panchayati Raj Statistics 2019

According to above table it is observed that a majority of the states have gone beyond the mandated 33.33% reservation except Uttar Pradesh which falls marginally short at 33 per cent. Additionally, out of all the states which had further increased their reservation to 50 per cent only Assam, Kerala and West Bengal meet the criteria. Karnataka falls marginally short at 48.48 per cent, whereas Punjab has only managed to fulfill the Constitutional mandate and remains at 33.33 per cent.

b) Representation of Weaker Sections: The 73rd amendment further mandates reservation of seats for SCs and STs in proportion of their population in the respective panchayat areas, and it also requires one-third of those seats to be reserved for women of these sections⁷².

Table 2: Percentage of SCs and STs amongst Elected Representatives in Panchayats 

Source: Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Annual Report 2014-15

It should be noted that the population figures are from the 2011 Census whereas the panchayat figures are based on 2008 data. Further, these figures are not disaggregated by panchayat areas but are just aggregate state figures. Therefore, these figures cannot be used as a precise estimate but merely as a general indicator of trends in these states. As per the figures all these states have fared reasonably well in terms of representation of the weaker sections in Panchayats.

ii.   Elections

The Constitution of India has stipulated direct elections of all members of Panchayats. For conducting these elections, all States are mandated to constitute a State Election Commission. Further, it has mandated five year terms for these panchayats73.

Table 3: Status of Elections to PRIs 

Source: Ministry of Panchayati Raj

Since the 73rd Amendment the conduct of elections has been regular in all these states. However, there have been some question marks on the actual conduct of elections in some states such as electoral violence, seats going uncontested due to fear of violence etc ⁷⁴

iii.   Devolution of Functions

The Constitution has mandated the State Legislatures to endow the PRIs with powers and authority to enable them to function as institutions of local self-governance⁷⁵. The State legislatures are to consider 29 areas for devolution to the Panchayats for the planning and implementation of schemes for economic development and social justice. However, the precise devolution of powers and authority to Panchayats has been left to the States. The functions entrusted to a Panchayat are as under ⁷⁶ :

1) Agriculture, including agricultural extension.
2) Land improvement, implementation of land reforms, land consolidation and soil
conservation.
3) Minor irrigation, water management and watershed development.
4) Animal husbandry, dairying and poultry.
5) Fisheries.
6) Social forestry and farm forestry.
7) Minor forest produce.
8) Small scale industries, including food processing industries.

9) Khadi, village and cottage industries.
10) Rural housing.
11) Drinking water.
12) Fuel and fodder.
13) Roads, culverts, bridges, ferries, waterways and other means of communication.
14) Rural electrification, including distribution of electricity.
15) Non-conventional energy sources.
16) Poverty alleviation programme.
17) Education, including primary and secondary schools.
18) Technical training and vocational education.
19) Adult and non-formal education.
20) Libraries.
21) Cultural activities.
22) Markets and fairs.
23) Health and sanitation, including hospitals, primary health centers and dispensaries.
24) Family welfare.
25) Women and child development.
26) Social welfare, including welfare of the handicapped and mentally retarded.
27) Welfare of the weaker sections, and in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes.
27) Welfare of the weaker sections, and in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes.
28) Public distribution system.
28) Public distribution system.
29) Maintenance of community assets.
29) Maintenance of community assets

Table 4: Devolution of Subjects in States 

Source: Devolution Report (2015-16): Where Local democracy and Devolution in India is heading towards?, TISS: Mumbai.

As per the above figures, 4 out of the 6 states have fared well in devolution, with Karnataka and Kerala having devolved all the subjects, followed by West Bengal and UP. However,Assam and particularly Punjab has fared poorly on devolution as also reflected from their devolution rank.While the selected states have done reasonably well on devolution, various studies have shown that lack of devolution at all India level is one of the major concerns for the poor performance of panchayats .⁷⁷

iv.   Financial Resources

A major portion of Part IX of the deals with the structural empowerment of the PRIs but the real strength in terms of both autonomy and efficiency of these institutions is dependent on their financial position (including their capacity to generate own resources). In general, Panchayats receive funds in the following ways:

• Grants from the Union Government based on the recommendations of the Central Finance Commission⁷⁸
• Devolution from the State Government based on the recommendations of the State Finance Commission⁷⁹
• Loans/grants from the State Government
• Programme-specific allocation under Centrally Sponsored Schemes and Additional Central Assistance
• Internal Resource Generation (tax and non-tax)⁸⁰

a.   Fourteenth Finance Commission Grants

As per the Constitution, Union Finance Commissions are required to make recommendations to augment the Consolidated Fund of a State to supplement the resources of the Panchayats in the State on the basis of the recommendations made by the Finance Commission of the State⁸¹. The status of actual allocation and release of grants to the rural local bodies under the 14th Finance Commission is as under:

Table 5: 14th Finance Commission Allocation of Grants to Rural Local Bodies (2015-20) 

Source: Ministry of Panchayati Raj Statistics 2019

Table 6: Fourteenth Finance Commission Allocation and Release of Grants to Rural Local Bodies (2018-19) 

Source: Ministry of Panchayati Raj Statistics 2019

The above tables suggest that the actual release of grants during the FFC was around 88 per cent in four of the six states whereas in Punjab and Assam there was no release of grants in 2018-19. Further, the formula adopted for distribution of grants is based on SFC in 4 out of the 6 states.West Bengal and Karnataka have distributed grants based on FFC.

Data from the Thirteenth Finance Commission shows that the panchayats’ own sources of revenue are very meager. Over the last decade, the own sources of revenue of PRIs have been less than 10% of their expenditure⁸². Therefore, panchayats are heavily dependent on grants from Union and State Governments. There is an imperative to ensure proper release of grants, as well as effective fiscal decentralization, so as to ensure that adequate finances are available with the panchayats for their proper functioning.

b.   State Finance Commission

The Constitution mandates each state to constitute a State Finance Commission every five years to review the financial position of the Panchayats and to make recommendations for⁸³:

• the distribution of the net proceeds of the taxes, duties, tolls and fees leviable by the State to the panchayats
• the determination of the taxes, duties, tolls and fees which may be assigned to the Panchayat
• the grants-in-aid to the Panchayats from the Consolidated Fund of the State
• the measures needed to improve the financial position of the Panchayats

Further, every recommendation made by the Commission under this article together with an explanatory memorandum by the Governor about the action taken is required to be laid before the State Legislature. The status of the SFC of the sample states is given below:

The Constitution provides for the appointment of SFCs within one year from the commencement of the Constitution Amendment Act 1992, and, thereafter, at the expiry of every fifth year. Thus, as per the Constitutional provisions, setting up of fifth SFC became due in 2014-15 in all the states. However, the table above shows that only four out of the six states have constituted their fifth SFC. Further, the record of many other states is even worse with many states having constituted just one or two SFCs⁸⁴.

Table 6: Status of State Finance Commissions 

Source: Ministry of Panchayati Raj Statistics 2019

Another important concern is the delay in tabling the SFC reports to the State Legislatures. Review of the SFC reports of states have revealed that the average time taken by them to submit their reports is around 32 months resulting in an average delay of about 16 months. And the average time taken by state governments to table the ATR (Action Taken Report) is around 11 months⁸⁵. Delay in the submission of reports by SFCs along with the delay in tabling the action taken reports in the legislature by state governments effectively means that very little time remains to work on the recommendations of SFCs. A steady and predictable flow of funds is essential for reliable provisioning of basic public goods, such delays means that the flow of funds to local governments is not steady and predictable thereby adversely impacting the delivery of basic services by the local governments.

c.   Devolution of Finance

While the 73rd amendment has mandated the SFC to give recommendations for Panchayat finances including the devolution of funds⁸⁶, however, the centrality of State governments in deciding the extent and process of decentralisation continues.The table below shows the per capita devolution in the sample states as recommended by the SFCs.

It can be observed that there is huge variation in the recommended per capita devolution across States. The average per capita recommended devolution for the period 2015-16 and 2019-20, varies between Rs.234.89 in case of Assam and Rs.6101.04 for Karnataka. As own revenues of local bodies is very small and most of the central funds are tied in nature, the devolution from SFC is an important source of untied funds to them. There needs to be some uniformity across states to ensure availability of adequate resources for panchayats in all states.

Table 7: Per Capita Devolution Recommended by SFCs (in Rs.) 

Source: NIPFP Working Paper Series, 2019⁸⁷

7.    Key Issues

Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) have been a remarkable success in certain areas especially related to political representation. Soon after the 73rd amendment, every state government began the process of creating the requisite layer of PRIs. State election commissions were in charge of the infrastructure required to elect local representatives.At the moment there are more than 260,000 PRIs and over three million elected local government representatives⁸⁸.

Additionally, the 73rd Amendment required that no less than one-third of the total seats in local bodies should be reserved for women. At 1.4 million, India currently has the most women in elected positions⁸⁹. Seats and sarpanch/pradhan positions were also reserved for SC/ST candidates. In a country where access is determined by gender and caste these changes are remarkable.

However, on all other areas representation, PRIs have been quite ineffective. Some of the key areas of concern are as follows:

1. Lack of Devolution of Functions: The 73rd Amendment does not mandate the transfer of various governance functions like the provision of education, health, sanitation, and Instead the amendment has listed the functions that could be transferred, and left it to the state legislature to actually devolve functions. There has been very little devolution of authority and functions in the last 25 plus years⁹⁰. PRIs cannot govern unless they are given the authority to actually perform functions related to governance. Further, because these functions are not adequately devolved, state executive authorities have proliferated to carry out these functions.
2. Inadequate Financial Resources: Local governments can either raise their own revenue through local taxes or receive intergovernmental The 73th Amendment recognized both forms of public finance, but did not mandate either.The power to tax, even for subjects falling within the purview of PRIs, has to be specifically authorized by the state legislature, a choice a lot of states have not exercised. Data has repeatedly shown that own sources of funds continue to be extremely meager⁹¹.

A second source of revenue generation is intergovernmental transfers, where state governments devolve a certain percentage of their revenue to PRIs. The constitutional amendment created provisions for State Finance Commissions to recommend the revenue share between state and local governments. However, these are merely recommendations and the state governments are not bound by them. Though finance commissions, at every level, have advocated for greater devolution of funds, there has been little action by states to devolve funds⁹². As a result, PRIs are so starved for funds that they are often unable to meet even basic obligations.

     3. Tied Nature of Central Funds: The central funds under schemes are tied to certain activities which are not always appropriate for all parts of the district This results in unsuitable activities being promoted or an under-spend of the funds⁹³.

    4. Excessive Control by Bureaucracy: In some States, the GPs have been placed in a position of subordination. GP Sarpanches have to spend extraordinary amount of time visiting Block Offices for funds and/or technical approval⁹⁴.These interactions with the Block staff office distort the role of a Sarpanch as an elected representative.

   5. Capacity Building: Capacity building of elected representatives and officials is critical for the empowerment of the Panchayats as well-functioning institutions of local self-government. Moreover, as the PRIs are being assigned increasing responsibilities in both developmental and regulatory activities, there is a growing concern about their The magnitude of the challenge is enormous. Around 30 lakh Elected Representatives and 10 lakh official functionaries have to be trained every year⁹⁵.

Recommendations

• There is an urgent need for devolution of 3Fs (Funds, Functions, Functionaries) by the States across the key sectors. Going forward states should progressively aim to devolve all 29 areas listed in Schedule XI of the Clarity on the role and responsibilities of the Panchayats of different tiers is provided by Activity Mapping which therefore is also important for the devolution of functions to the Panchayats.
• The Panchayats need to be given the right to levy and collect taxes, tolls, fees, user charges on their own with minimum and maximum rates, and such collection needs to be incentivised in order to reduce their dependence on the Central and State Government transfers.
• Effective financial devolution is of utmost importance so as to ensure that the funds available with the Panchayats are adequate to fulfill the mandated functions.
• The share of transfers to the PRIs from the State Governments as untied grants needs to be increased by consolidating the State schemes into untied grants (as Kerala has done). Further, the formula to allocate grants to the PRI as a share of the State revenues needs to be explicitly defined through State lagislation.
• There is a need to develop a comprehensive Capacity Building strategy based on thorough Capacity assessment to address gaps at both, the individual and institutional level.

Conclusion

The Constitutionally mandated PRIs in India, in terms of the size of the electorate, the number of grass roots institutions (about 260,000), the number of elected representatives (3.1 million), and in terms of empowerment of women (about 1.4 million elected women representatives), is the greatest experiment in democracy undertaken anywhere in the world or at any time in history. However, over the last three decades while they have succeeded in representation, especially of women and weaker sections, many challenges with respect to governance remain.

Currently moving towards completing 30 years there is a need to set in motion a new set of reforms. The time has come to move from political representation to power devolution. There is a need for the state political leadership to accept the importance of PRIs, and devolve power to them as mandated by the Constitution of India. Building the capacities of PRIs not as mere implementers of projects but as planners and evaluators would help strengthen the institution. There is also a need for elected local leaders to come together with their constituents, and demand more control and autonomy as enshrined to them by the Constitution of India.

References

Aiyar, Mani Shankar. 2014. Inclusive Governance for Inclusive Development: The History, Politics and Economics of Panchayat Raj. Chapter 4 in J.P. Faguet and C. Pöschl (eds.). 2015. Is Decentralization Good for Development? Perspectives from Academics and Policy Makers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Basic Statistics of Panchayati Raj Institutions, 2019, Ministry of Panchayati Raj, New Delhi.

Chishti, A. (2001). Committees and Commissions in Pre-independence India, 1836-1947: 1903- 1912: Mittal Publications.

Constitutional Assembly Debates, 4th November 1948.

Dayal, R. (1966). Community Development Programme in India. Allahabad: Kitab Mahal.

Devolution Report (2015-16): Where Local democracy and Devolution in India is heading towards?,TISS: Mumbai.

Dey, S. K. (1964). Community Development: a Bird’s-eye View. New Delhi: Asia Publishing House Bombay.

Gandhi, M., & Vyas, H. (1962).Village Swaraj: Navajivan Publishing House.

Goel, S. R. S. (2009). Panchayati Raj in India: Theory & Practice (2nd Rev. & Enlg: Deep and Deep Publications.

Government of India Act. 1935.

Government of India, Committee on Plan Projects. 1957.Report of the Team for the Study of Community Projects and National Extension Service, Vol. I, II, New Delhi, National Development Council.(Chairman: Balvantrai Mehta).

Government of India. 1963. Report of the Study Team on Position of Gram Sabha in Panchayati Raj Movement (Chairman: R.R. Diwakar), New Delhi.

Government of India1978.Report of the Committee on Panchayati Raj Institutions (Chairman: Asoka Mehta), New Delhi, Department of Rural Development, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation.

Gupta, Manish and Chakraborty, Pinaki. April, 2019. State Finance Commissions: How successful have they been in Empowering Local Governments?. NIPFP, No. 263: New Delhi.

H.D.Malaviya, 1956.Village Panchayats in India, Economic and Political Research Department, AICC, New Delhi.

Jain, S. C. (1967). Community Development and Panchayati Raj in India. New Delhi: Allied Publishers.

Kashyap, A. (1989). Panchayati Raj. Views of our Founding Fathers and Recommendations of Different Committees. New Delhi: Lancer Books.

Kohli, Atul. 1987. The State and Poverty in India: The Politics of Reform, Cambridge, U.K., Cambridge University Press.

Kulke, Hermann and Rothermund, Dietmar (2006). A History of India, Routledge, London. Mathew, G. (1994). Panchayati Raj from Legislation to Movement: Concept Publishing Company

Mathew, G. (1995). Status of Panchayati Raj in the States of India, 1994. New Delhi: Institute of Social Sciences.

M.K.Gandhi. Collected Works, vol 85, pp 32-34.

Mohanty, Meera, “Devolution of power to sarpnchs ineffective in practice: CAG”, Economic Times, May 14, 2020, Bhubaneshwar.

Rajiv Gandhi, Selected Speeches and Writings, 1988,Vol. IV, Publications Division, New Delhi, speech to District Magistrates at Jaipur, 30 April 1988, p. 156 and p.161.

Rao,G.V.K.1985.Report of the Committee to Review the ExistingAdministrativeArrangements for Rural Development and Poverty Alleviation Programmes (CAARD),Department of Rural Development, Ministry of Agriculture.

Rao, S. (1967).The Framing of India’s Constitution. Select documents: 1946 – 1947. New Delhi: Indian Inst. of Public Administration.

Roadmap for the Panchayati Raj (2011-17): An All India Perspective, Ministry of Panchayati Raj, New Delhi.

Sewell, R. (1882). Lists of the Antiquarian Remains in the Presidency of Madras (Vol. 1): E. Keys, at the Government Press.

Simon Commission Report 1930.

Some Successful Panchayats. Case Studies. (1960). New Delhi: Government of India. S.S.Singh et al. 1997. Legislative Status of Panchayati Raj Institutions in India, IIPA, New Delhi. The Bengal Village Self Government Act, 1919.

The Orissa Gram Panchayat Act, 1948.

Wadhwani, M. and S.N. Mishra.(ed.) 1996. Dreams &Realities: Expectation from Panchayati Raj, IIPA,

Footnotes:

1 Sewell, R. (1882). Lists of the Antiquarian Remains in the Presidency of Madras (Vol. 1): E. Keys, at the Government Press.

2 Mathew, G. (1994). Panchayati Raj from Legislation to Movement: Concept Publishing Company.

3 Goel, S. R. S. (2009). Panchayati Raj in India:Theory & Practice (2nd Rev. & Enlg: Deep and Deep Publications.

4,5,6,8,9,10,11,14 Ibid

Chishti, A. (2001). Committees and Commissions in Pre-independence India, 1836-1947: 1903- 1912: Mittal Publications.

12 Goel, S. R. S. (2009). Panchayati Raj in India:Theory & Practice (2nd Rev. & Enlg: Deep and Deep Publications.

13 Simon Commission Report 1930.

15 https://lawsofindia.blinkvisa.com/statelaw/5764/TheBengalVillageSelfGovernmentAct1919.html

16 http://www.southasiaarchive.com/Content/sarf.144124/210921/005

17 Government of India Act. (1935).

18 Kulke and Rothermund 2006.

19 Goel, S. R. S. (2009). Panchayati Raj in India:Theory & Practice (2nd Rev. & Enlg: Deep and Deep Publications. 20,22,23,24,26, 27 Ibid

21 Mathew, G. (1994). Panchayati Raj from Legislation to Movement: Concept Publishing Company.

25 Some Successful Panchayats. Case Studies. (1960). New Delhi: Government of

28 Gandhi, M., & Vyas, H. (1962).Village swaraj: Navajivan Publishing House.

29 Some Successful Panchayats. Case Studies. (1960). New Delhi: Government of India.

30 H.D.Malaviya, 1956.Village Panchayats in India, Economic and Political Research Department, AICC, New Delhi.

31 M.K.Gandhi. Collected Works, vol 85, pp 32-34.

32 Rao, S. (1967).The Framing of India’s Constitution. Select documents: 1946 – 1947. New Delhi: Indian Inst. of Public Administration.

33 Kashyap, A. (1989). Panchayati Raj.Views of our Founding Fathers and Recommendations of Different Committees. New Delhi: Lancer Books.

35 Rao, (1967).The Framing of India’s Constitution. Select documents: 1946 – 1947. New Delhi: Indian Inst. of Public Administration.

36 https://www.constitutionofindia.net/constitution_of_india/directive_principles_of_state_policy/articles/Article%2040

37 http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/v11p10m.html.

38 Mathew, (1994). Panchayati Raj from Legislation to Movement: Concept Publishing Company.

39 Ibid

40 The Orissa Gram Panchayat Act,

41 Mathew, (1994). Panchayati Raj from Legislation to Movement: Concept Publishing Company.

42 Kohli, 1987.The State and Poverty in India:The Politics of Reform, Cambridge, U.K., Cambridge University Press.

43 Dey, K. (1964). Community Development: a Bird’s-eye View. New Delhi: Asia Publishing House Bombay.

44 Ibid

45 Dayal, (1966). Community Development Programme in India. Allahabad: Kitab Mahal.

46 Jain, C. (1967). Community Development and Panchayati Raj in India. New Delhi: Allied Publishers.

47 Government of India, Committee on Plan 1957.Report of the Team for the Study of Community Projects and National Extension Service,Vol. I, II New Delhi, National Development Council.(Chairman: Balvantrai Mehta).

48 Government of 1963. Report of the Study Team on Position of Gram Sabha in Panchayati Raj Movement (Chairman: R.R. Diwakar), New Delhi.

49,50, 52, 54, 57 Ibid

51 Aiyar, Mani Shankar. 2014. Inclusive Governance for Inclusive Development:The History, Politics and Economics of Panchayat Raj. Chapter 4 in J.P. Faguet and C. Pöschl (eds.). 2015. Is Decentralization Good for Development? Perspectives from Academics and Policy Makers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

53 Mathew, G. (1995). Status of Panchayati Raj in the States of India, 1994. New Delhi: Institute of Social Sciences.

55  https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/kerala/a-few-hits-and-many-misses/article23631243.ece

56 Government of India1978.Report of the Committee on Panchayati Raj Institutions (Chairman: Asoka Mehta), New Delhi, Department of Rural Development, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation.

58 Rajiv Gandhi, Selected Speeches and Writings, 1988,Vol. IV, Publications Division, New Delhi, speech to District Magistrates at Jaipur, 30 April 1988, 156 and p.161.

59 Rao, V.K. 1985.Report of the Committee to Review the Existing Administrative Arrangements for Rural Development and Poverty Alleviation Programmes (CAARD),Department of Rural Development, Ministry of Agriculture.

60 http://ncsc.nic.in/files/Chapter4.pdf

61, 66, 67 Ibid

62Wadhwani, and S.N. Mishra.(ed.) 1996.Dreams &Realities : Expectation from Panchayati Raj, IIPA, New Delhi.

63Ibid

64 Two documents became the basis for the draft amendment to the constitution that inaugurated the present era of Panchayat Raj.The first was the outline of constitutional amendments suggested by a the Ashok Mehta committee, 1978, and the second was a draft of a possible constitutional amendment prepared in 1986 by L.M. Singhvi (who was also a member of the Asoka Mehta committee).

65 S.Singh et al. 1997. Legislative Status of Panchayati Raj Institutions in India, IIPA, New Delhi.

68https://www.educat ion.gov.in/sites/upload_files/mhrd/files/upload_document/73amend.pdf

69 The Fifth Schedule of the Constitution deals with the administration and control of Scheduled Areas as well as of Scheduled Tribes residing in the areas other than States of Assam, Meghalaya,Tripura and Mizoram. PESA is a Central legislation that extends the Provisions of the Panchayats, as given in Part IX of the Constitution to the Fifth Schedule Areas with certain modifications and The States with Fifth Schedule Areas that are covered under PESA are Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Rajasthan and Telangana.

70 Clause (3) of Article 243D of the Constitution

71 https://theprint.in/opinion/77-women-in-panchayati-raj-institutions-believe-they-cant-change-things-easily-on-ground/644680/

72 Clause (1) and (2) of Article 243D of the Constitution

73 Article 243E of the Constitution.

74 https://indianexpress.com/article/north-east-india/tripura/tripura-panchayat-polls-86-seats-won-uncontested-cpm-blames-bjp-armed-gangs-5827175/

75 Article 243G of Part IX of the Constitution.

76 These 29 areas are listed in the Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution.

77 Devolution Report (2015-16): Where Local democracy and Devolution in India is heading towards?,TISS: Mumbai.

78 Article 280 of the Constitution.

79 Article 243I of the Constitution.

80 Article 243H of the Constitution.

81 Article 280(3) (bb) of the Constitution.

82 https://nipfp.org.in/media/medialibrary/2019/05/WP_263_2019.pdf

83 Article 243I of the Constitution.

84 https://nipfp.org.in/media/medialibrary/2019/05/WP_263_2019.pdf

85 Ibid

86 Article 243H of the Constitution.

87 https://nipfp.org.in/media/medialibrary/2019/05/WP_263_2019.pdf

88 https://www.panchayat.gov.in/documents/20126/0/Statistical+handbook_MoPR+02082019.pdf/4988ca1b-4971-1f3b-54e7-980228eb47f9?t=1564729098415

89 Ibid

90 https://nipfp.org.in/media/medialibrary/2019/05/WP_263_2019.pdf

91 https://www.panchayat.gov.in/documents/20126/0/Panchayati_Raj_Final_pdf_02-5-11.pdf/8aa0a6bd-bdfa-0144-b89b-cd7a78d79981?t=1554872219971

92 Ibid

93 https://nipfp.org.in/media/medialibrary/2019/05/WP_263_2019.pdf

94 https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/devolution-of-power-to-sarpanchs-ineffective-in-practice-cag/articleshow/75741839.cms?from=mdr

95 https://www.panchayat.gov.in/documents/20126/0/Panchayati_Raj_Final_pdf_02-5-11.pdf/8aa0a6bd-bdfa-0144-b89b-cd7a78d79981?t=1554872219971